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In Defense of Geographic Disparity
A response to Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional:
The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World,
87 MINN. L. REV. 679 (2003).
Craig Allen Nardt
One of the most controversial issues in international pat-
ent law relates to "biopiracy," which concerns the exploitation
of indigenous traditional knowledge by Western' firms without
justly compensating the keepers of the knowledge.2 A high-
profile example is the neem tree controversy.3 The leaves and
t Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law, Technology, and the
Arts, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I am grateful to
Olufunmilayo Arewa, Graham Dutfield, Christopher Heath, F. Scott Kieff, and
Marco Ricolfi for their helpful comments.
1. The term "Western" is used here to refer to the developed world; how-
ever, in the context of traditional knowledge it is common to use the terms
"North" and "South," whereby the North represents the developed world.
2. Traditional knowledge is susceptible to multiple definitions. See Gra-
ham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 233, 240-42 (2001) (discussing difficulty in defining traditional
knowledge); see also Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of Tradi-
tional Knowledge Holders 25-26, World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) (Apr. 2001), http://www.wipo.org/globalissues/tk/ffm/report/fmal/
pdf/partl.pdf [hereinafter Intellectual Property Needs] (discussing the meaning
of "traditional knowledge"). In this article, I am only concerned with technical
or scientific knowledge. As with traditional knowledge, there is no accepted
definition of "biopiracy." Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Devel-
opment Policy 74, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (Sept. 2002),
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf. To
the extent meaning can be gleaned from examples, I am concerned with West-
ern firms, who make a genuine inventive contribution, but, unfortunately, fail
to (1) obtain the consent of the holders of traditional knowledge, and (2) equi-
tably compensate the holders from rents earned from the commercial exploita-
tion of the invention. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
3. The controversy has been well mined by commentators. See, e.g.,
VANDANA SHIVA, BIoPiRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 69-
73 (1997); Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict over
222
2003] GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY
bark of the neem tree, which is indigenous to India, have been
used as natural pesticides and medicine by the people of India
for years.! In the early 1990s, a multinational company, W.R.
Grace, obtained United States and European patents on pesti-
cide products derived from the neem tree.5 One of the European
patents was invalidated as lacking novelty,6 but the validity of
the American patents remained intact.7 The central reason for
this difference is that unlike European patent law, the United
States patent code distinguishes between prior knowledge and
use in foreign countries and prior knowledge and use in the
United States." Specifically, American patent law does not rec-
ognize as prior art knowledge and use in a foreign country,
such as that involved in the neem case.9
This geographic disparity in the American patent code has
been the subject of much criticism, 10 most recently by Professor
Margo A. Bagley of Emory University School of Law." In her
well-written article, Professor Bagley contends that the geo-
graphic limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 102 is unconstitutional and
bad policy. 2 I challenge those assertions. By advocating the
the Commodification of Life, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 279, 283-86
(1999).
4. SHIVA, supra note 3, at 69-73.
5. See, e.g., European Patent No. 0436 257 B1 (issued Sept. 14, 1994)
(patenting a "[miethod for controlling fungi on plants by the aid of... neem
oil"), http://12.espacenet.com/espacenet/bnsviewer?CY=ep&LG=en&DB=EPD&
PN=EP0436257&ID=EP+++0436257Bl+I+.
6. See Press Release, Eurpean Patent Office, "Neem Tree Oil" Case:
European Patent No. 0436 257 Revoked (May 10, 2000), http://www.european-
patent-office.org/news/pressrel/2000_05_11_e.htm. The invalidated European
patent was specifically challenged by two Indian nongovernmental organiza-
tions. Alex Kriby, U.S. Tree Patent Challenged, BBC NEWS, May 5, 2000, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/738002.stm.
7. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,946,681 (issued Aug. 7, 1990) ("Method to
Prepare an Improved Storage Stable Neem Seed Extract"); U.S. Patent No.
5,124,349 (issued June 23, 1992) ("Storage Stable Azadirachtin Formulation").
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2000).
9. See id. Although foreign knowledge and use cannot be used as prior
art, foreign inventive activity (i.e., conception and reduction to practice) can
serve as proof of date of invention for purposes of obtaining patent rights. See
35 U.S.C. § 104 (2000).
10. See, e.g., Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Rais-
ing Questions About Current U.S. Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69 (2001);
Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art
and the Neem Tree Controversy, 37 IDEA 371 (1997).
11. See Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical
Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679 (2003).
12. See id. at 679-91.
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elimination of this geographic disparity and thereby allowing
foreign knowledge and use to serve as prior art, Professor Bag-
ley seeks to protect developing nations and indigenous peoples
from Western countries' patent law regimes.' 3 In contrast, I ar-
gue for a proactive approach whereby patent rights serve not
only to induce the commercialization of products derived from
traditional knowledge, but also to compensate the keepers of
traditional knowledge, while respecting the need to conserve
the host country's biodiversity.14 Under this approach, the geo-
graphic disparity in American patent law is crucial.
Professor Bagley asserts that the geographic distinction in
§ 102 is unconstitutional because it "allows the patenting of in-
ventions in the public domain." 5 According to Professor Bagley,
the Framers of the Intellectual Property Clause (IP Clause),
expressed in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution, were skeptical of monopolies and "sought to avoid
the granting of patents on 'old' information." 6 Novelty is indeed
the sine qua non of patent protection, but I believe Professor
Bagley's conception of the "public domain" is too broad and does
not fully take into account the utilitarian nature of American
patent law.' While it is true that the Framers drafted the IP
Clause in the shadow of abusive monopolistic practices,' 8 the
13. See id.
14. See infra notes 40-71 and accompanying text.
15. Bagley, supra note 11, at 687.
16. Id. at 685.
17. The preamble of the IP Clause, "To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts," is expressed in utilitarian terms. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8; Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Informa-
tion, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 59 (2001) (noting that "the basic ideologi-
cal commitment of American intellectual property is actually heavily utilitar-
ian, not Lockean or Hegelian"); Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual
Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. PIrr. L. REV. 453-61 (2001)
(asserting that "the conceptual model underlying American intellectual prop-
erty law is utilitarian: rights are granted for social objectives (advancing
knowledge and producing useful products)"). Compare the philosophical influ-
ences of European intellectual property law, which is grounded in Kantian and
Hegelian notions of personality, inalienability, and self-expression. Thomas F.
Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7
(1997) (noting that "European intellectual property law ... derives in large
part from a concept of property developed by Immanuel Kant and Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel").
18. See Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) ("The [IP] clause is
both a grant of power and a limitation.... It was written against the backdrop
of the practices-eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies--of the
[English] Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or busi-
nesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public."); see also EDWARD
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driving force behind the clause was the enhancement of public
welfare.' 9 Section 102 of the patent code is consistent with utili-
tarianism because the geographic distinction provides an incen-
tive to invest in and commercialize products derived from tradi-
tional knowledge-products that otherwise would most likely
remain undeveloped or out of reach for a vast majority of poten-
tial beneficiaries. 0 Moreover, the wealth created from commer-
cialization could, indeed should, be shared with the host coun-
try and keepers of the traditional knowledge.2' The prospect of
a patent allows for wealth creation and access to products
based on traditional knowledge in a manner that benefits many
more people than would otherwise have benefited,22 and it is
WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF THE USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN
PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 1787-1836 39 (1998). According to one
scholar,
it is precisely because the delegates were familiar with the Statute of
Monopolies ... that they were not about to give the Congress any
general power to create monopolies .... If therefore they were to give
power to Congress to secure exclusive rights for limited times to in-
ventors in their discoveries, it was necessary to do so expressly.
Id.
19. As the Supreme Court stated in Mazer v. Stein, "The economic phi-
losophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copy-
rights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors
and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'" 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
20. See generally WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR
INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S.
MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT), (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://papers.nber.org/papers/
w7552.v5.pdf (showing empirical evidence indicating the importance of patent
rights to the pharmaceutical industry); Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the
Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 831 (2002) (observing that
patent incentives in the pharmaceutical industry are "critical"); Arti K. Rai &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 289 n.1 (2003) (noting that "[viarious empirical
studies have underscored the critical role played by patents on end-stage
pharmaceutical products").
21. See infra notes 53-77; see also F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmen-
talists, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 307, 317-18 (2002) (discussing how the com-
mercialization of products derived from biodiversity can, under a patent sys-
tem, benefit the custodians of the biodiversity).
22. It is worth noting that a significant portion of pharmaceuticals are de-
rived from plants. See Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between Interna-
tional Intellectual Property and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and
Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 255, 273 (1998) ("About one-quarter of all
prescription drugs in the United States contain as their active ingredient a
compound extracted or derived from plants."); Thomas Eisner, Chemical Pros-
pecting: A Proposal for Action, in ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHICS: THE BROKEN
CIRCLE 198 (F.H. Bormann & S. Kellert eds., 1991) ("Drugs from nature make
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this result the Framers sought to promote.23
Professor Bagley makes several points relating to the pol-
icy ramifications of § 102's geographic distinction.24 Citing the
neem tree example, Professor Bagley states that "[i]f [W.R.]
Grace patented the same invention in the United States, where
§ 102(b)'s geographical limitation would bar evidence of public
use of the invention in India, European consumers could have
competitive market access to an invention only available to
U.S. consumers at monopoly pricing levels."25 My initial re-
sponse to this statement is: at least there is a product on the
market. It is reasonable to assume that, absent a geographic
distinction (i.e., absent patent rights), a pharmaceutical firm
would not invest millions of dollars in commercialization ef-
forts, thus depriving all consumers.26 Moreover, exploiting the
patent in the rich United States market27 could lead to signifi-
cant profits that would form part of a benefit-sharing arrange-
ment.28
Furthermore, Professor Bagley's market-differential sce-
nario is unremarkable given the lack of uniformity among pat-
ent law regimes. The availability of a patent on any type of in-
ventive contribution varies from country to country, depending
on eligible subject matter or a particular reading of patentabil-
ity requirements. Consider, for example, how American patent
law treats biotechnology vis-A-vis European patent law. In
1998, the European Parliament, concerned about the competi-
tive threat of a robust American biotech industry, issued a bio-
up a large fraction of our pharmaceutical arsenal. In the United States alone,
upwards of one-quarter of all medical prescriptions involve formulations based
on plant or microbial products or on derivatives or synthetic versions
thereof.").
23. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
24. See Bagley, supra note 11, at 688-91.
25. Id. at 688.
26. See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
27. In 2002, more than half (53.4%) of the pharmaceutical industry's
revenues were from sales in the United States. PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES
REVIEW BOARD ANNUAL REPORT 19 (2002), http://www.pmprb.com/CMFiles/
ar2002e21LEF-6252003-6142.pdf. Germany accounted for 6.2%; France, 5.3%;
the United Kingdom, 3.9%; and Italy, 3.7%. Id. See generally Jean 0. Lanjouw,
A New Global Patent Regime for Diseases: U.S. and International Legal Issues,
16 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 85, 102-03 (2002) (proposing a patent enforcement
mechanism that would "maintain research incentives ... limited to diseases
with markets that are concentrated in the rich countries").
28. See infra notes 53-71 and accompanying text. It is for this reason that
other wealthy markets for pharmaceuticals (e.g., Europe and Japan) should
amend their patent laws and adopt a prior art geographic distinction.
[Vol 88:222
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technology directive codifying patent protection for biotech-
related inventions. 9 The directive was over ten years in the
making and has been adopted by only a minority of E.U. mem-
ber states, despite a deadline of July 30, 2000.30 One of the
principal points of contention among several countries1 and po-
litical parties32 in adopting the directive continues to be the
patenting of DNA sequences, which is stridently opposed on
grounds of public morality.3 3 This intra-E.U. discordance over
biotech patents highlights an important distinction between
the American and European patent systems. Like its counter-
29. See Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. 3,
1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 18 [hereinafter Directive].
30. Patents: EC Faults Members for Not Implementing Directive for Legal
Protections of Inventions, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA)
(Jan. 29, 2003) [hereinafter EC Faults Members].
31. The Netherlands, which unsuccessfully brought legal action against
the E.U. Parliament to annul the Directive, and France are the two most
prominent opponents. See Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Pat-
enting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union:
An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1623, 1657 (2001). Even though the French government was not a
party to the Dutch lawsuit, "French officials [were] especially vigorous in their
efforts to circumscribe the patenting of human DNA sequences. French Presi-
dent Jacques Chirac [] stressed the need to prevent any possibility of patent-
ing the discovery of a gene, except for its therapeutic or diagnostic applica-
tions." Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Environmentalists have been particularly vociferous in their opposi-
tion to the European Parliament Directive. EC Faults Members, supra note 30.
33. In an attempt to address this concern, Article 6(1) of the Directive
states that inventions are "unpatentable where their commercial exploitation
would be contrary to ordre public or morality." See Directive, supra note 29,
art. 6(1) at 18. This section mirrors Article 53(a) of the European Patent Con-
vention, which excludes from patent protection "inventions the publication or
exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality." European
Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 53(a), 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 272. For an ex-
cellent discussion of the public morality requirement in the context of biotech-
nology, see Marco Ricolfi, Biotechnology, Patents and Epistemic Approaches, J.
BIOLAw & Bus., Bio-EthixTM Special Supplement, at 77 (2002). The public
mortality argument against patenting DNA sequences is all but a whisper in
American law circles. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent
Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 247,
249 (2000). As noted by Cynthia Ho,
Although courts once relied on "moral utility" to deny patent protec-
tion for inventions used solely for gambling or fraud, no court has re-
lied on this doctrine since the PTO Board of Appeals held that an in-
vention used solely for gambling could be patentable in the 1977
decision of Ex parte Murphy.
Id. (citing Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1977)).
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part in the United States, the European Patent Office (EPO)
has issued patents on human DNA.34 Contrary to the American
system, however, a patent granted by the EPO matures into
individual national patents (as designated by the applicant),
which are governed by their respective national laws. 35 There is
no such thing as a European patent that is valid throughout
the entire E.U.36 Member states, which often have divergent in-
terpretations of the European Patent Convention, retain juris-
diction over issues of infringement and scope of patent protec-
tion,37 thus increasing the likelihood of disparate enforcement.38
Therefore, while great strides have been made toward patent
harmonization within the E.U. and throughout the world, uni-
formity among nations remains unrealized.39
Professor Bagley also notes that the United States con-
demns the pirating of American intellectual property by trad-
ing partners, yet the geographic disparity in § 102(b) "facili-
tates the 'pirating' of unpatented, unpublished, traditional
knowledge."4" I agree that the United States has been willing to
34. For a hyperlink to a list of the worldwide applications for patents of
human gene sequences, see Guardian Unlimited, Patent Applications: Full
List, (Nov. 15, 2000), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/genes/article/
0,2763,397503,00.html.
35. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECUTAL
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 994, 996, 1009 (2001).
36. Id.
37. See European Patent Convention, supra note 33, arts. 64, 138, 1065
U.N.T.S. at 295-96; see also Friedrich-Karl Beier, The European Patent Sys-
tem, in THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 462, 464 (Fre-
derick Abbott et al. eds., 1999)
38. An oft-cited example of disparate enforcement is the "Epilady" patent
litigation in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. For a his-
tory of the litigation, see Sanford T. Colb, The Epilady Hair Remover Litiga-
tion, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SERIES 1993: SUCCESSFUL MULTI-
COUNTRY PATENT LEGISLATION STRATEGIES 107 (Practicing Law Institute ed.,
1993).
39. A recent example of divergent patentability requirements is the
Canadian Supreme Court case involving Harvard University's onco-mouse.
See Commissioner of Patents v. President and Fellows of Harvard College,
[20021 D.L.R. (4th) 577. This transgenic mammal has been patented in several
countries, but the Supreme Court of Canada refused to extend patent protec-
tion because a higher life form, in the Court's opinion, is not a "composition of
matter" or "article of manufacture" under Section 2 of the Canadian Patent
Act. See id. at 578, 580; see also Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 4 (1970) (Can.).
Interestingly, the Canadian Supreme Court refused to follow the lead of the
famous American case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty and its well-known language:
"Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the
sun that is made by man.'" 447 U.S. 333, 309 (1980) (citation omitted).
40. Bagley, supra note 11, at 688-89.
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"push and prod developing countries into accepting intellectual
property rules,"4 and that Western firms should compensate
keepers of traditional knowledge.4 '2 As Professor Balgey notes,
however, traditional knowledge is unpublished43 and, I would
suggest, underutilized. The virtue of a patent is its ability to
"smoke out" this knowledge and to provide an inducement for
firms to develop products derived therefrom--products that
otherwise may not be realized. I am not suggesting that patent
rights can solve all suboptimal innovation patterns across all
industries, and I am sympathetic to concerns prompted by re-
cent proprietary trends in intellectual property law. My focus
here is only on pharmaceuticals, an industry that relies heavily
on patent rights.44
In addition, Professor Bagley argues that the geographic
distinction no longer makes sense because information is gen-
erally more accessible today than it was in 1836, when the dis-
tinction found its way into the patent law.4' Though the as-
sumed rationale for the geographic limitation may be
anachronistic,46 doing away with it (and therefore the prospect
of patent rights) would obstruct wealth creation. Professor Bag-
ley suggests, however, that even if the geographic distinction is
removed, pharmaceutical firms "can still deliver new drugs
based on traditional knowledge" as long as the drugs are novel
and nonobvious. 7 Perhaps, but I am not as sanguine as she.
First, the pharmaceutical company brings something to the ta-
ble by way of testing and refining products-endeavors that are
quite costly and not necessarily lacking in inventive contribu-
tion. Second, and more directly responsive, establishing and
documenting the precise prior art parameters of traditional
knowledge, preserved mainly in oral histories, is a difficult un-
41. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM 100
(2002) (discussing United States' use of "Special" 301 and the amendment to
Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000)).
42. See infra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
43. See Bagley, supra note 11, at 688-89.
44. See supra note 22. This article does not address the important issue of
drug access in the developing world such as that which played out in South
Africa a few years ago. Rather, I am concerned with patent law's incentive dy-
namic as it relates to traditional knowledge and notions of benefit sharing.
45. Bagley, supra note 11, at 712-24.
46. For a historical discussion of the geographic distinction in § 102, see
Donald S. Chisum, Foreign Activity: Its Effect on Patentability Under United
States Law, 11 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 26, 33-42 (1980).
47. Bagley, supra note 11, at 719.
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dertaking." Blurred prior art boundaries lead to uncertainty,
which is undesirable in a property rights regime. Third, infor-
mation is a classic public good,4 9 and, as a general matter, ac-
cessibility without exclusivity leads to serious inefficiency con-
cerns. 5 The aforementioned uncertainties brought about by a
48. As Graham Baines states:
An investigator of traditional knowledge faces a daunting challenge,
and many difficulties. Irrespective of "scientific objectivity", differ-
ences of perception, values and language between those who hold tra-
ditional knowledge and those who wish to document it and apply it
are significant. Unless investigators of traditional knowledge make
more effort to understand these differences and to develop effective
investigative methods then, at best, incomplete revelations of tradi-
tional knowledge will result. At worst, the information obtained will
prove misleading.
Graham B.K. Baines, Conclusion: Issues in the Application of Traditional
Knowledge to Environmental Science, in TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYs 67, 68 (Robert E. Johannes ed., 1989).
There is indeed a movement afoot to document traditional knowledge. See,
e.g., The World Bank Group's Indigenous Knowledge Program, at
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/iklindex.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2003). The
goals of this movement, however, must be defined. According to the World
Bank, the "ultimate objective" of its internet-based indigenous knowledge pro-
gram "is to help mainstream indigenous/traditional knowledge into the activi-
ties of development partners and to optimize the benefits of development as-
sistance, especially to the poor." Id. If the goal is to create patent-destroying
prior art, then this movement seems to be misguided for reasons discussed in
this article. It makes sense, however, if the goal is to provide for a centralized
database of traditional knowledge with an eye towards commercial exploita-
tion. One must be careful, however, not to disclose too much, lest prior art be
created. As Professor Coenraad Visser noted, "If you want to exploit the tradi-
tional knowledge by means of compilation or a transfer technology agreement,
then it is in your interest to disclose as little as possible in the agreement."
Coenraad Visser, Panel Remarks at Fordham Law School Symposim on Global
Intellectual Property Rights, in The Law and Policy of Protecting Folklore,
Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 768 (2002). He goes on to suggest that the "solu-
tion.., seems to be to tag ... [s]o you would list in the database only the
items that are available for the transfer of technology." Id.
49. Public goods have two characteristics. They are nonrival (i.e., inex-
haustible) and nonexclusive. A good is nonrival if consumption by one person
does not leave any less of the good to be consumed by others. A good is nonex-
clusive if people cannot be excluded from consuming it. In addition to informa-
tion, other public goods include national defense, television signals, and police
protection.
50. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 102D CONG., FINDING A BALANCE:
COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 185 (1992). According to a report by the Office of
Technology Assessment,
Individuals have an incentive not to pay for the good, or to under-
value it, in hopes of getting access as "free riders." The inability to ex-
clude free riders distorts market signals and is thought to result in
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change to § 102 would weaken the prospect of a strong property
right. As a result, in the pharmaceutical industry, private or-
dering and benefit sharing would suffer because traditional
knowledge will not be optimally commercialized.51
While it is true that this argument can apply to domestic
knowledge (i.e., knowledge within the United States), it is not
my intent to read the knowledge and use provisions out of the
patent code. Rather, I believe there is something special about
traditional knowledge in developing countries. Specifically, the
patenting and commercial exploitation of products based on
their traditional knowledge can bring much-needed capital to
these countries and their indigenous populations.52
Professor Bagley and I are on common ground when she
argues that indigenous peoples deserve to be compensated for
the commercial exploitation of their traditional knowledge.
This concern is important; however, the problem here is not the
availability of patent protection but rather the lack of an ade-
quate compensatory mechanism for developing nations and in-
digenous peoples. 4 Safeguards must be put in place so as to
prevent "biopiracy" similar to the Hoodia cactus incident.55 The
inefficient allocation of resources to nonexclusive goods and under-
production of them, relative to socially optimal quantities.
Id. For a more detailed discussion of public goods and the market failures as-
sociated with them, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS, 33-38, 107-10, 120-22, 167-72 (2004).
51. For a discussion of a commercialization-based patent system sup-
ported by a strong property right, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Prop-
erty Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); see
also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265 (1977); Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and
the Anti-Monopoly Laws (pts. 1-5), 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC&Y 85, 159, 241, 328,
422 (1942).
52. Even if traditional knowledge were properly catalogued and thus ren-
dered prior art under the current version of § 102, we may nonetheless want to
treat this prior art as nonpatent defeating. That is, if our goal is to provide in-
centives to commercialize products derived from traditional knowledge and
enhance benefit-sharing opportunities, it may be desirable to have a develop-
ing nation prior art exception. This proposal may also help address the "how
much to disclose" problem associated with documentation efforts discussed by
Professor Visser. See supra note 48.
53. See Bagley, supra note 11, at 689 (noting the lack of equitable com-
pensation for use of traditional knowledge).
54. See Dutfield, supra note 2, at 273 (asserting "that the exploitation of
traditional peoples and communities, including holders of [traditional knowl-
edge], is fundamentally due to a widespread failure to respect their basic
rights").
55. In 1996, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in
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availability of patent protection must be accompanied by a
compensatory structure and mutual consent so that the keep-
ers of traditional knowledge will be equitably compensated, the
sovereignty of the host nation respected, and its biodiversity
conserved.
One way to accomplish these goals is through a contractual
arrangement and a notification provision that are consistent
with the aims of patent law and biodiversity conservation. To
this end, it is preferable, as Professor Marco Ricolfi has argued,
to amend the domestic patent laws of developed countries to
South Africa isolated and patented the active hunger-suppressing component,
P57, of the Hoodia cactus. See Ginger Thompson, Bushmen Squeeze Money
from a Humble Cactus, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at A4. The patent was sub-
sequently licensed to the British firm Phytopharm, who in turn licensed the
patent to Pfizer for $21 million in payments. See Antony Barnett, In Africa the
Hoodia Cactus Keeps Men Alive. Now Its Secret Is 'Stolen' to Make Us Thin,
THE OBSERVER, June 17, 2001, http'//education.guardian.co.uk/print/
0,3858,4205467-102275,00.html. The San people, who have known about the
hunger-suppressant qualities of the Hoodia cactus for thousands of years,
were not told of the commercialization of the patented product and did not
receive any remuneration from the sales thereof. Id. In fact, the Pfizer
spokesman thought the San people were extinct. Id. After an international up-
roar, CSIR entered into an agreement with the San people recognizing their
traditional knowledge and paying them six percent of the royalties made from
sales of the patented product. Id.
56. A full discussion of the notification requirement is beyond the scope of
this article. Such a requirement, however, could resemble the proposal made
by the Colombian delegation at the World Intellectual Property Organization's
Third Session of the Standing Committee on the Law of Patents. See Protec-
tion of Biological and Genetic Resources, WIPO, WIPO Doc. SCP/3/10 (Sept. 8,
1999), http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/session_3/pdf/scp3-lO.pdf. The
proposal stated:
Every document shall specify the registration number of the contract
affording access to genetic resources and a copy thereof where the
goods or services for which protection is sought have been manufac-
tured or developed from genetic resources, or products thereof, of
which one of the member countries is the country of origin.
Id. Consent could be subsumed within the duty to disclose all information ma-
terial to patentability under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2002)
(detailing the duty to disclose material information regarding patentability). A
failure to obtain consent or fraudulently obtained consent can be sanctioned by
a finding of inequitable conduct. See Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Dis-
closure of the Origins of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent in Pat-
ent Applications Without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and
the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 371, 396-401 (2000) (describing the use
of equitable doctrines by U.S. courts and arguing that disclosure of consent be
required for the enforcement of patent rights); see also Willem Pretorius,
TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level Is the Playing Field?, in GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT
183, 187-88 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002) (arguing that TRIPS
should require a patent applicant to prove it obtained explicit consent).
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require lawful acquisition of genetic resources and an equitable
compensatory arrangement based on the commercial exploita-
tion of these resources.57 A less satisfactory, though workable,
approach is to encourage the formation of voluntary contractual
relationships between the keepers of traditional knowledge and
those who desire it. A prominent example is the bioprospecting
agreement 5s entered into between the Instituto Nacional de
57. See Ricolfi, supra note 33, at 85. According to Professor Ricolfi, "a
missing link is bound to remain unless appropriate cooperation by recipient
states is not ... put in place." Id. In addition to domestic action, many coun-
tries, organizations, and scholars have argued that TRIPS, which does not
address protection of traditional knowledge, should be amended to reflect the
need for equitable compensation and consent, thereby aligning TRIPS more
closely with the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)-an "international legal
framework that has sought to encourage the formation of mutually beneficial
relationships between providers and users of genetic resources based on a con-
cept of bilateral agreement," Michael I. Jeffrey Q.C., Bioprospecting: Access to
Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing Under the Convention on Biodiversity
and the Bonn Guidelines, 6 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 747, 749 (2002). See, e.g.,
id. at 773; Kamal Puri, Biodiversity and Protection of Traditional Knowledge,
in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 82, 84-85 (Chisum et al. eds., 2001); cf. Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, arts. 8(j), 16, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force
Dec. 29, 1993) (describing the guidelines for conserving and transferring tradi-
tional knowledge via equitable contractual arrangement). For instance, Kenya,
on behalf of the African group, proposed a footnote be added to Article 27.3(b)
of TRIPS to provide for "the protection of the innovations of indigenous and
local farming communities in developing countries, consistent with the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity and the International Undertaking on Plant
Genetic Resources." Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b) 13(i), Council
for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc.
IP/C/W163 (Nov. 8, 1999), http://docsonline.wto.org/ddfdocuments/t/IP/C/
W163.doc. The WTO, in its recent Doha Ministerial Declaration, instructed
the Council for TRIPS to "examine.. . the relationship between the TRIPS
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of tradi-
tional knowledge and folklore." Ministerial Declaration T 19, Ministerial Conf.,
4th Sess., WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001),
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/tIWT/min01/DECl.doc (adopted Nov.
14, 1999). Oxfam has recommended that the "TRIPS regime should be har-
monised with the Convention on Biodiversity." Oxfam, Cut the Cost-Patent
Injustice: How World Trade Rules Threaten the Health of Poor People at 36
(Feb. 2001), http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what we do/issues/health/downloads/
patentinjustice.pdf; see also Pretorius, supra note 56, at 187-88 (asserting that
"TRIPS should ... contain a requirement that the enforcement of patent
rights should be subject to the disclosure, at the time of registration, of the
country of origin of biological materials and/or traditional knowledge"). The
United States, however, has resisted amendments to TRIPS relating to tradi-
tional knowledge, prompting commentators such as Professor Graham Dut-
field to remark, "It seems highly unlikely that a new framework to protect
[traditional knowledge] will be inserted into TRIPS anytime soon." Dutfield,
supra note 2, at 273.
58. I use this term only to refer to a mutually beneficial contract between
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Biodiveridad (INBio),'59 a private, nonprofit, Costa Rican or-
ganization, and Merck, the U.S. pharmaceutical company.60 The
terms of the Merck agreement are confidential, but it is known
that Merck paid INBio $1.35 million in return for 10,000 sam-
ples of flora, soil, and insects collected by INBio and for infor-
mation about how these samples have been traditionally used.6'
Merck is also obligated to pay INBio royalties on future sales of
products developed from the samples,62 which are invested, in
part, in conservation efforts.63
a developing nation and either a private concern (e.g., a pharmaceutical com-
pany) or a developed nation. Sometimes these agreements are referred to as
"Material Transfer Agreements" (MTAs). See generally Secretariat, Opera-
tional Principles for Intellectual Property Clauses of Contractual Agreements
Concerning Access to Generic Resources and Benefit Sharing 6, WIPO Inter-
governmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore 2d Sess., WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/3 (Sept. 10,
2001) [hereinafter WIPO Operational Principles] (explaining the usage of the
term "MTA"), http://www.wipo.int/eng/meetings/2001/igc/pdf/grtkfic2-3.pdf. A
properly drafted bioprospecting agreement should be consistent with the goals
of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). See supra note 57; see also
WIPO Operational Principles, supra, at 19 (providing information on extant
contractual practices and related intellectual property clauses for access to
and benefit-sharing of genetic resources). According to Charles McManis, a
"consensus is developing among scientists, world bodies, anthropologists, and
conservationists, that the best way for developing countries to capture the
benefits of biodiversity is through a system of intellectual property, environ-
mental, and contractual protection designed to harmonize the goals of devel-
opment and conservation by building an international framework for sustain-
able biodiversity prospecting." McManis, supra note 22, at 270.
59. INBio states that it is an "institution leader in the search and popu-
larization of the knowledge about biodiversity and its sustainable uses" and its
mission is to "[piromote a new awareness of the value of biodiversity, and
thereby achieve its conservation and use to improve the quality of life." Insti-
tuto Nacional de Biodiveridad, at http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/default.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2003).
60. See Christopher Joyce, Prospectors for Tropical Medicines, NEW
SCIENTIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 36, 36-39 (describing the Merck/INBio agree-
ment). INBio also has numerous contractual arrangements with other private
companies and academic institutions. See, e.g., Agreements with Academia,
Instituto Nacionale de Biodiversidad, at http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/
academicos.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2003) (listing INBio's academic agree-
ments); Agreements with the Industrial Sector, Instituto Nacional de Biodi-
versidad, at http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/comerciales.htm (last visited Oct.
17, 2003) (listing INBio's industrial agreements).
61. See Frank J. Penna & Coenraad J. Visser, Cultural Industries and In-
tellectual Property Rights, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A
HANDBOOK 390, 397 (Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002).
62. Id.
63. See Bioprospecting Agreements, Insituto Nacional de Biodiversidad, at
http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdbfacuerdos.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2003). INBio
describes their bioprospecting agreements as follows:
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The seed for this type of contractual agreement was
planted by the idea of "chemical prospecting," which Thomas
Eisner, who coined the phase, defined as an "exploratory proc-
ess by which new, useful natural products are discovered."
64
Eisner advocated that developing nations, because of their geo-
graphic proximity to and interest in conserving their biodiver-
sity, could act as screening laboratories that would, in a non-
invasive manner, search natural products for chemical and bio-
logical activities and isolate the active components of these
products.65 According to Eisner:
The inevitable follow-up to the discovery of chemical uses of selected
organisms would be the establishment of working linkages with uni-
versities and industries-initially, perhaps, mostly in developed na-
tions-that would undertake the characterization and synthesis of
the active chemicals uncovered. At that stage, proprietary arrange-
ments could be made to insure that profits derived from the eventual
commercialization of the new chemicals revert in fair measure to the
nations that did the screening.6
Each agreement has its corresponding work plan and research
budget that establishes a 10% donation to the Ministerio del Ambi-
ente y Energia (MINAE) (Ministry of the Environment and Energy),
which helps cover direct biodiversity conservation costs. Furthermore,
it contributes to increasing services, species identification, sample col-
lection and preparation, collection records, information management,
training, management ....
In prospecting, the processes are executed in conjunction with re-
search centers, universities, and national and international compa-
nies. This network of associations makes state-of-the-art technologies
available and provides the opportunity to rapidly and efficiently train
Costa Rican scientists as well as laboratory and field personnel. At
the same time, this type of collaboration generates financial resources
that are used to fund the country's conservation activities, and also
other research projects oriented towards satisfying the demands of
users who contribute to the country's sustainable development.
Id.
64. Eisner, supra note 22, at 196.
65. See id. at 200-01.
66. Id. at 201; see also Bioprospecting Agreements, Insituto Nacional de
Biodiversidad, at http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/acuerdos.htm (last visited Oct.
17, 2003). Other prominent examples of bioprospecting arrangements include
efforts made by the National Cancer Institute (NCI). See generally Edgar J.
Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate
of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 719-24 (1995)
(detailing the efforts of the NCI). The NCI has awarded millions of dollars to
nonprofit organizations to engage in research in biodiversity-rich countries in
Central and South America, Asia, and Africa. Id. Although under the contracts
the NCI will own any resulting patent rights, the developing country will re-
ceive royalty payments, a representative from that country will be listed as a
codiscoverer, and the NCI will offer technical training to local personnel. Id.
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The nature and nuances of bioprospecting agreements are
complex and variable,67 and they are not without problems. 68
Particularly troubling issues include asymmetrical bargaining
power, domestic technology-transfer management (e.g., the
ability to screen and organize traditional knowledge and repre-
sentative legitimacy at the bargaining table), and internal in-
stitutional concerns (e.g., the establishment of a legal frame-
work or comparable structure that recognizes and properly
assigns ownership interests in traditional knowledge; deter-
mines who should collect, manage, and equitably distribute
royalties; and monitors such to assure probity in the collection
and distribution).69
The NCI's "Letter of Collection" states:
While investigating the potential of natural products in drug discov-
ery and development, NCI wishes to promote conservation of biologi-
cal diversity, and recognizes the need to compensate source country
organizations and peoples in the event of commercialization of a drug
developed from an organism collected within their borders .... The
NCI will make sincere efforts to transfer knowledge, expertise, and
technology related to drug discovery and development to the [appro-
priate Source Country Institution] in [Source Country] as the agent
appointed by the [Source Country Government or Source Country Or-
ganization], subject to the provision of mutually acceptable guaran-
tees for the protection of intellectual property associated with any
patented technology.
National Cancer Institute, Letter of Collection, 1-2 (obtained from corre-
spondence with Dr. Gordon Cragg, National Products Branch, NCI) (on file
with the author). The NCI's "Memorandum of Understanding" uses virtually
identical language. See id. Two commentators have called the NCI "one of the
leaders in implementing the mandates of the Biodiversity Convention." Asebey
& Kempenaar, supra, at 720.
67. For a discussion of the principles and operation of contractual ar-
rangements relating to traditional knowledge, see WIPO Operational Princi-
ples, supra note 58, at 18-22.
68. The agreement between INBio and Merck has been criticized by a va-
riety of authors. See, e.g., Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 66, at 726-30; Neil
D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Ownership of
Plant Genetic Resources, 28 TULSA L.J. 587, 627-29 (1993); Shayana Kadidal,
Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical Patents, 103 YALE L.J. 223, 234-35
(1993); Kirsten Peterson, Recent Intellectual Property Trends in Developing
Countries, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 277, 288-89 (1992). See generally Klaus
Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime Concerning
Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 111, 141-
45 (1996) (criticizing the current system of preserving biodiversity).
69. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000)
(discussing the institutional problems in the developing world associated with
managing capital and recognizing property rights); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE
OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM (1989) (same). A partial
solution to these concerns is to create a nonprofit organization as a centralized
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Nonetheless, these contractual arrangements are a positive
development. They reflect an implicit concession that develop-
ing nations should be compensated for their traditional knowl-
edge and that developed countries have a vested interest in
biodiversity conservation. Bioprospecting agreements also cre-
ate wealth for keepers of the traditional knowledge and devel-
oping nations, wealth that can be invested in, among other
things, research and development, health care, conservation, or
general infrastructure. ° Moreover, developing nations and in-
digenous peoples do not incur the often prohibitively high cost
of obtaining and enforcing patent rights.71 Lastly, and perhaps
most importantly, bioprospecting agreements will yield the
commercialization of medicines that will benefit many more
lives than would be the case absent a meeting of the minds.
While there is a tendency to adopt a paternalistic attitude
when discussing patent rights and the developing world, and
while Western notions of property rights frequently differ from
those of indigenous peoples, it is worth noting the results of
an extensive empirical study conducted by the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO).78 In 1998 and 1999, WIPO
conducted nine fact-finding missions in twenty-eight countries
to discern the "IP needs and expectations of TK [traditional
knowledge] holders."74 These missions resulted in several inter-
esting findings; most notably, WIPO found that "[d]espite criti-
cism of IP laws ... by certain informants, many others ex-
pressed interest in exploring further the actual and potential
role of the IP system in TK protection, m and informants also
coordinating entity. But as Professor Visser has experienced from his work in
Venezuela, the indigenous tribes have concerns about the creation of a corpo-
rate entity. See Visser, supra note 48, at 769-70. He states that the tribal eld-
ers "see the corporation as supplanting the traditional authority structure in
the tribes." Id. at 770.
70. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
71. See Penna & Visser, supra note 61, at 397 (asserting that a "basic
problem" with holders of traditional knowledge obtaining patents themselves
"is that a patent protects active ingredients that have been isolated and
tested" and "[sluch isolation and testing may cost hundreds of millions of dol-
lars and are out of reach for most developing countries, let alone their indige-
nous peoples").
72. See, e.g., Kamal Puri, Cultural Ownership and Intellectual Property
Rights Post-Mabo: Putting Ideas Into Action, 9 INTELL. PROP. J. 293, 307-09
(1995) (arguing that Aboriginal communities and Western ideas of copyright
differ).
73. See generally Intellectual Property Needs, supra note 2.
74. See id. at 17.
75. Id. at 223.
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expressed the desire to facilitate a "dialogue and contact be-
tween TK holders, the private sector, governments, [non-
governmental organizations], and other stakeholders to assist
in developing modalities for cooperation between them, at com-
munity, national, regional and international levels."76 As the
Indigenous Peoples Secretariat submitted, the WIPO report
"could focus on the fact that [the] commodification [of tradi-
tional knowledge] ... does not per se work to the detriment of
the rights of traditional knowledge holders, but, under appro-
priate conditions to be further investigated and defined, can in
fact work to their benefit.""
Further investigation of the virtues and problems of patent
rights in the developing world is in order, but given the promise
of contractually marrying proprietary rights with traditional
knowledge, cautious optimism is also in order. And while Pro-
fessor Bagley provides an important alternative, I believe that
a proactive use of patent law compares favorably to a system
that seeks to render patent protection unavailable for products
derived from traditional knowledge.
76. Id. at 218.
77. Id.
[Vol 88:222
